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Abstract 
While extensive literatures study the responsiveness of policy to public opinion and the 
influence of interest groups, few studies look at both factors simultaneously. This article offers 
an analysis of the influence of media advocacy and public opinion on political attention and 
policy change for four regulatory issues over a relatively long period of time in Sweden. The 
data pools together measures of public support for specific policies with new data on attention 
to the policy issues in the Swedish parliament, policy developments over time and detailed 
coding of the claims of interest advocates in two major Swedish newspapers. Analyzing this 
data, a complex picture without a general tendency for either public opinion or media advocacy 
to act as dominant forces in producing policy change is revealed, although some evidence is 
found that the public is successful in stimulating political attention when it supports policy 
proposals aimed at changing the status quo. 
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Introduction 
The question of who gets the policies they desire is one of the central problems in the study of 
democratic governance. Normative accounts of democracy usually posit that the public's 
preferences should have an impact on the policies delivered by politicians (Dahl 1956). 
Accordingly, a large literature investigates the extent to which public opinion is related to policy 
(for reviews, see Shapiro 2011; Wlezien 2016). In parallel to this literature, another body of 
research considers an additional force in public policy making: the role of interest groups. In 
recent years, the extent to which lobby groups influence public policy has gained renewed 
interest and new designs to study interest group influence have been introduced (for an 
overview, see Dür 2008; Helboe Pedersen 2013; Bernhagen et al. 2014; Binderkrantz & 
Rasmussen 2015; Rasmussen et al. 2018). Although the question of how strong interest group 
influence really is remains unsettled (see, e.g., Lowery 2013), there is considerable normative 
criticism of strong interest group influence, which may not be desirable due to the risk of 
interest groups persuading policy makers to adopt policies that differ from those desired by the 
median citizen. 
While large bodies of literature exist that examine policy responsiveness to the public and 
to interest groups separately, studies of public policy that integrate both factors are limited (for 
reviews, see Burstein & Linton 2002; Burstein 2014). Moreover, the evidence in the few 
existing studies (e.g., Gray et al. 2004; Gilens 2012; Lax & Phillips 2012; Burstein 2014; Gilens 
& Page 2014; Giger & Klüver 2016; Bevan & Rasmussen 2017) that examine both the impact 
of public preferences and interest groups on policy change is mixed. Most of these studies do 
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not examine the evolution of policies over time even if a diachronic perspective is crucial for 
judging the potential causal impact of interest groups and public opinion on public policy. 
In this article, we seek to deepen our understanding of how the public and interest groups active 
in the media (referred to as ‘media advocates’) influence public policy by examining two 
aspects of policy making: political attention (the attention to specific policy issues in the 
legislature) and policy change. We focus on four policy issues for which public opinion has 
been measured over a relatively long time period in Sweden: the phasing out of nuclear energy; 
the introduction of a six-hour working day; allowing the sale of beer, wine and liquor in 
supermarkets; and lowering taxes on alcohol. The four issues are selected so that they exhibit 
variation in the extent of public and media advocacy support for policy change both between 
and within issues over time. 
For each policy issue, we carefully trace the policy developments over 10–16 year time 
periods using a variety of data sources. We link this policy information to data on public opinion 
on these four issues provided by the SOM Institute (see the Online Appendix). In addition, to 
track media advocacy on these issues, we conduct a detailed media content analysis of all claims 
made by advocates on the policy issues in two major Swedish newspapers for the entire period 
of analysis. Our definition of media advocates covers a broad selection of non-state actors 
including ‘ traditional ’  interest advocates like labour unions, business associations and 
companies, but also actors such as scientists and think tanks. 
We analyze the impact of media advocates and public opinion on public policy making 
in a mixed-methods design. We start with a quantitative analysis identifying the general patterns 
related to the dynamics of political attention and policy change in our dataset before examining 
these patterns at greater resolution in a set of in-depth studies of the individual policy cases. In 
this way we are able to scrutinize the mechanisms that drive political attention and produce 
change and to interpret the general findings in the context of the individual cases. Such a 
strategy is especially well-suited to the study of policy change, as this is typically a rare event 
that is not easily modelled statistically (Goemans 2007). 
We find some support for the hypothesis that public opinion affects political attention, 
but our findings invite scepticism as to the ability of either public opinion or media advocacy 
to strongly influence policy making. The evidence is particularly striking with respect to the 
production of actual policy change where neither the media advocates nor public opinion seem 
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to play a leading role in any of our cases. Despite the high public support and considerable 
media advocacy support that some of the proposals for policy change have enjoyed, we observe 
only one genuine case of policy change in our dataset – and, remarkably, this one case has 
occurred in a context of modest public support and net opposition from media advocates. 
These findings are important given the common expectation that the extent to which these 
two types of actors affect policy change should be inversely related. Worries about interest 
group influence are voiced partly because such influence is expected to come at the expense of 
diminished influence of the public, based on the expectation that groups, such as those active 
in the media, are not representative of broader public opinion. However, rather than finding a 
trade-off in the influence of these two types of actors, we discover little evidence that any of 
them play a strong role in our cases. This finding matters because, especially in a country with 
strong democratic credentials like Sweden, one would expect public opinion to have a stronger 
impact on the attention paid to policy issues and policy change than in other countries. The 
implication is that neither advocacy nor public opinion may impact political attention or specific 
policy changes as much as is often assumed by the academic literature and citizens alike. 
 
Public Opinion and Interest Groups as Drivers of Public Policy 
Most of the studies of policy responsiveness (for reviews, see Shapiro 2011; Wlezien 2016) 
examine either static congruence between public opinion and concrete policies (e.g., Lax & 
Phillips 2012) or dynamic responsiveness between public opinion and indirect proxies for 
policy, such as spending (Mortensen 2010; Soroka & Wlezien 2010), attention (Mortensen 
2010; Bevan & Jennings 2014; Alexandrova et al. 2016) or latent constructs, such as the ‘policy 
mood’ (Stimson et al. 1995). Attention to policy issues during the agenda-setting stage and 
policy change are typically studied in isolation, while both of these aspects are important for 
understanding public policy making. In this article we study the influence of both public opinion 
and interest groups on political attention and on policy change in a diachronic design that 
analyzes concrete policy proposals with a methodology integrating quantitative analysis with 
in-depth case evidence. Combining a dynamic approach with a focus on concrete policy 
proposals provides us with additional leverage to assess the causal relationships between 
opinion, interest groups and policy. 
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Empirical studies of the link between public opinion and policy generally find ample 
evidence that the two are related, although some studies are somewhat sceptical regarding the 
strength of the link between public opinion and (American state) policy. In a comparison across 
policies and jurisdictions, Lax and Phillips (2012, 149) emphasize that the likelihood of policy 
being in line with the public opinion majority is roughly speaking equal to flipping a coin. 
Dynamic approaches to the study of the link between public policy and policy usually find 
stronger links and argue that public opinion drives policy change. Yet, as they mostly use 
indirect and/or aggregate policy indicators, it remains difficult to connect their insights to the 
study of specific policy changes. 
Studies of the representation of the public in policy have been criticized for not 
considering other factors, such as group advocacy that may confound the relationship between 
public opinion and policy – leading to fears that the impact of public opinion on policy is 
overestimated (Burstein & Linton 2002; Burstein 2014). However, just as with public opinion, 
it is not straightforward to assess the causal impact of interest groups and advocates on policy. 
For many years, this led scholars to examine other questions (De Bièvre & Dür 2007), but lately 
there has been a growth in studies that have presented new research designs for studying 
influence (for a review, see Dür 2008). While groups may act as a transmission belt helping to 
transfer public views to policy makers (Rasmussen et al. 2014), group involvement in politics 
might also lead to bias in policy making. This happens if decision makers listen to interest 
groups due to the resources they may offer, even when groups do not represent the median 
voter. So it may seem surprising that, for a very long time, separate bodies of literature have 
examined how public opinion and interest advocates influence policy making. 
The few studies that do include both interest groups and public opinion find varying 
results about the impact of groups on policy making. Some reach the conclusion that they matter 
(Gilens 2012; Lax & Phillips 2012; Gilens & Page 2014). Others present a more mixed view 
(Gray et al. 2004; Bevan & Rasmussen 2017) echoing a trend in existing interest group 
scholarship of influence to find ‘only mixed or weak results’ (Lowery 2007). The differences 
in findings are interesting given that the vast share of existing research focuses on the American 
political system. However, rather than being contradictory, it is possible that they result from 
differences in analysis designs and operationalizations. It may, for example, be harder to find 
strong relationships in studies using crude indicators of groups and policy, such as when group 
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counts are related to either policy liberalism (e.g., Gray et al. 2004) or attention to broader 
policy areas (e.g., Bevan & Rasmussen 2017), than in studies linking policy positions to 
outcomes on specific policies (Gilens 2012; Gilens & Page 2014). In the latter there may be a 
closer match between the explanatory and outcome variables since we can be confident that the 
interest group measures and outcomes relate to the same policies. 
Moreover, even among studies of specific policies, it may matter how information about 
group preferences is collected. Those that measure interest group preferences based on the 
views of the most powerful interest groups only (e.g., Gilens 2012; Lax & Phillips 2012; Gilens 
& Page 2014) could, for example, be more likely to find a relationship between their measures 
and policy outcomes than those which consider (activities of) a wide selection of groups 
(Burstein 2014). Ultimately, it is important to be sensitive to such differences in approaches 
when comparing the findings from the different studies. 
We opt for an issue-specific approach measuring advocacy and public opinion on 
concrete topics, which has the advantage that we do not have to assume that politicians react to 
general ideological views of the population or overall volumes of group activity when adopting 
specific policies. Moreover, we emphasize the need for studies to look at interest group opinions 
and activities, on the one hand, and the trajectory of these specific policies over long periods of 
time, on the other, while considering the potentially competing or complementary effects of 
public opinion. 
To date, only a few American studies on social movement activity and specific policies 
adopt such a design, and they typically focus on one type of policy or interest only (Burstein & 
Freudenburg 1978; McAdam & Su 2002; Soule & Olzak 2004; Soule & King 2006; Agnone 
2007; Olzak & Soule 2009). We supplement these studies with a detailed analysis of how claims 
reported in the media by a wide range of advocates are related to political attention and policy 
change on four different policy issues over long time periods, while accounting for the 




The Hypothesized Effects of Public Support and Media Advocacy on Political 
Attention and Policy Change 
Theoretically, there are at least two ways in which politicians can respond to citizens and media 
advocates in the process of public policy making. The first focuses on political attention, 
meaning that politicians discuss and consider issues that citizens and interest groups care about.  
The second puts emphasis on substantive policy outcomes and examines whether the opinions 
of citizens and groups are in fact reflected in actual policy outcomes (Berry et al. 2002) and 
whether policy changes are in line with public preferences. Political attention and policy change 
can be considered as two steps in the policy-making process that provide opportunity for 
responsiveness to public opinion and interest groups. Not only is political attention (and 
discussions in the legislature) a necessary step for policy change, but the former can also 
substitute to some extent for the latter. Discussing an issue can signal responsiveness to the 
wishes of the general public or special interests even when real policy change is not feasible. 
Therefore, we analyze both outcome variables in the current article. 
The Public Opinion–Policy Linkage 
There are good theoretical reasons to expect that politicians in democratic political systems will 
be responsive to the public. As politicians are – at least partially – driven by the desire to be re-
elected (Stimson et al. 1995), they would want to respond to shifts in the public desire for a 
given type of policy by introducing policy changes. When the public exhibits strong support 
for a policy proposal that is different from the status quo, politicians and political parties can 
increase their appeal to the citizens by enacting the policy proposal. Otherwise, they risk being 
viewed as unresponsive to the wishes of the public and out of touch with what the citizens want, 
with negative electoral consequences. This dynamic is reinforced when party elites have 
positive views of the rationality of public opinion (as is the case in Sweden), which increases 
the likelihood that they consider the public's wishes (Ekengren & Oscarsson 2011). 
However, even when policy change is impossible – for political, technological or other 
reasons – politicians can still signal responsiveness to the public by bringing the issue to the 
political agenda and discussing it in the legislative arena. When the public, and especially the 
part with strong opinions on the policy issue, favours an alternative policy proposal, it implies 
that it is dissatisfied with the policy status quo. In that case, there are political points to be 
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scored by debating the underlying policy problem and putting it on the political agenda. And, 
in any case, making and debating policy proposals is, of course, a necessary step before actual 
policy change – a point corroborated by a study finding that the attention paid to a policy area 
in the Danish parliament is related to spending on that same issue (Mortensen 2010). Therefore, 
we expect that public opinion will affect both political attention and policy change: 
H1a: The higher the public support for a policy proposal (that is different from the policy 
status quo), the more attention politicians will pay to the issue. 
H1b: The higher the public support for a policy proposal, the more likely that the policy 
proposal will be enacted. 
Media Advocates and Representation 
Yet even when the public strongly supports a policy alternative, it needs to compete for political 
attention and influence with other actors, among which interest groups and advocates loom 
large. The media are an important venue for advocates and have become increasingly important 
in the communication between politicians and citizens (Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999). Advocates 
that want to raise awareness of an issue or change policy often have to rely on the media in 
addition to other strategies to achieve their goals (Binderkrantz 2005), and media advocacy in 
European countries has received increasing attention recently (Binderkrantz et al. 2015, 2017). 
The idea that many interest groups rely on media attention is also evidenced by the fact that 
news coverage in the media offers a somewhat closer reflection of the overall composition of 
the Danish interest group population than other arenas (Binderkrantz et al. 2015). 
In theoretical terms, advocates use the media to pursue at least two goals. Firsty, actors 
who want to change the status quo will likely try and raise attention for the policy issue. 
Previous studies have shown that advocates tend to actively lobby at specific points in time and 
on specific issues (Baumgartner et al. 2009), usually around policy junctures when policy may 
change. Hence, we expect claim-making by advocates to occur around specific periods in time 
and to drive political attention to the policy issue. 
H2: The higher the number of advocates making claims in the media on an issue, the 
more attention politicians will pay to the issue. 
Theoretically, we should not expect that the number of media advocates on an issue as such 
should influence the likelihood of policy change. This is because the media advocates can split 
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in supporting conflicting proposals for policy change or face a counter-mobilization in defence 
of the status quo. Therefore, it is the relative support by the population of media advocates that 
a policy proposal receives that should affect the likelihood of policy changes, rather than the 
overall volume of advocacy. In other words, when the population of advocates is dominated by 
actors supporting a policy alternative different from the status quo, there should be a higher 
chance that policy will change in the direction that these advocates prefer (Gilens 2012; Lax & 
Phillips 2012; Gilens & Page 2014). Similarly, we expect that if there is high relative support 
among the media advocates in support of a policy proposal (that is currently not the policy in 
place), this will put more pressure on politicians to address it – thus increasing political attention 
to the issue. To summarize the preceding discussion: 
H3a: The higher the relative media advocacy support for a policy proposal that would 
change the policy status quo, the more attention politicians will pay to the issue. 
H3b: The higher the relative media advocacy support for a policy proposal, the more 
likely that the policy proposal will be enacted. 
 
Research Design 
We examine the hypotheses presented above in an empirical study of four policy issues in 
Sweden. Sweden distinguishes itself by the availability of high quality longitudinal data on 
public opinion on specific policy questions enabling us to examine a period of time that is 
relatively long compared to existing studies of policy responsiveness. Focusing on a single 
country also allows us to keep the institutional context constant across policy issues and over 
time. Sweden is a vibrant representative democracy with a stable party system, free media and 
a well-established system of interest representation – all features that should make Sweden a 
likely case for finding responsiveness to public opinion compared to other political systems. In 
contrast, Sweden might offer less favourable conditions for media advocacy to influence policy 
making as a result of its corporatist tradition where policy is often decided in collaboration with 
the types of interest groups who have been granted privileged insider access to the political 
system itself (Siaroff 1999; Öberg et al. 2011). 
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Selection of Policy Issues 
The sampling frame from which we draw our four cases is constrained by the availability of 
longitudinal data on public opinion. However, the set of specific policy issues on which 
relatively long time-series on public opinion data are available in Sweden does not seem biased 
towards policy issues on which policy change has not happened yet and involves issues of 
varying media saliency. To control for the fact that the policy type of an issue (Lowi 1964) 
might affect the overall level of advocacy, we select regulatory policy issues only. In addition, 
our issues are selected to ensure variation in public opinion and media advocacy support both 
between the issues and within issues over time. As discussed below, our sample includes a 
policy proposal for which public support went from positive to negative to positive again, one 
that remained positive and two that went from positive to negative during our study period. One 
proposal was supported by a minority of media advocates, another had majority support and the 
level of support switched over time for the remaining two. The issues also vary in the volume 
of advocacy they generated, again both between issues and over time for the same issue (see 
Figure A2 in the Online Appendix). The selection results in the following policy proposals: the 
phasing out of nuclear energy; the introduction of a six-hour working day; allowing the sale of 
alcohol1 in supermarkets; and lowering taxes on alcohol2. 
These four issues vary in terms of the amount of media debate they generate, both across 
issues and within them over time. As an example, the newspapers Svenska Dagbladet and 
Dagens Nyheter published, on average, 28 articles a year about the phase-out of nuclear energy, 
but only five about allowing the sale of alcohol in supermarkets. Our issues also vary in terms 
of the amount of political attention they receive. At most, the nuclear issue featured in 3.5 
percent of all documents produced by the Riksdag in a given year. As an example, this is 
comparable to the very salient (in Sweden) topics of NATO membership (3.9 percent of all 
documents in a year) and privatizing elderly care (3.6 percent of all documents) during the same 
observation period, which suggests that, at its peak, the nuclear issue was very high on the 
political agenda. The other issues were less salient. Having variation in media saliency is 
                                                 
1 The formulation on the question of alcohol sales in Swedish refers to ‘livsmedelbutiker’, which is a slightly 
broader category of stores than just supermarkets. 
2 The question on alcohol taxes refers to taxes on beer, wine and spirits, but since these cover most alcoholic 
beverages, we discuss them as ‘taxes on alcohol’. 
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important since it may influence the ability of citizens and media advocates to influence policy 
making (Lax & Phillips 2012). 
Unit of Analysis 
We focus on concrete policy proposals to ensure a direct match between the way the public 
opinion survey items are phrased and the policy options we track, and we stick to a narrow 
interpretation of the survey questions (e.g., we refrain from assuming that lack of public support 
for increasing taxes is equivalent to public support for decreasing taxes). The advantage is that 
our measures attain high face and construct validity. The concreteness of our definition of the 
unit of analysis raises a relatively high bar for finding responsiveness, but we see this as a 
positive feature of our approach enabling us to connect public opinion, media advocacy and 
public policy directly, without further assumptions about the nature and dimensionality of the 
underlying policy space. 
Measurement and Data 
We consider both political attention and policy change. The former is defined as the attention 
to a policy issue in the legislature and measured as the number of documents that address a 
certain policy issue publicized by the Swedish parliament (Riksdag) in a year. The documents 
were retrieved from the online archive of the Riksdag and include the minutes from plenary 
sessions; motions, reports and legislative proposals by the government; reports by organizations 
that are associated with the Riksdag; and plenary proposals by parliamentary committees. Since 
the measure includes documents that are presented by the government, it measures more than 
just the Riksdag's agenda and we consider it a proxy for the attention paid to the issue by 
politicians. 
To measure the second outcome of interest we construct a comprehensive picture of the 
policy developments on the four issues during the period of analysis. For each hypothesis we 
thoroughly and systematically study and use a wide variety of written sources: legislative 
documents, policy briefs, media analyses, as well as existing academic literature. For the 
statistical analysis we construct a binary variable that tracks whether national policy changed 
in line with the policy proposal as expressed in public opinion in a particular year. 
Turning to the explanatory variables, we rely on data from the SOM Institute at the 
University of Gothenburg (see the Online Appendix) to measure public opinion. This is a rather 
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exceptional data source as the public has been asked about its opinion on the exact same policy 
issues for at least ten years. This is important given that existing large-N scholarship on 
responsiveness has been criticized for not being able to assess the specificities and 
developments of specific policies (e.g., Petry & Mendelsohn 2004). Based on this data, we 
construct a measure of public support for a policy proposal defined as the percentage of the 
Swedish public who think the policy proposal is ‘good’ or ‘very good’ from those with an 
opinion (those who think the proposal is ‘good’, ‘very good’, ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’). 
To capture our variables tracking media advocacy, we coded statements in the media. For 
each of our policy issues, we conducted a search in two major broadsheet newspapers: Svenska 
Dagbladet and Dagens Nyheter. While Sweden lacks a newspaper that clearly represents the 
left side of the political spectrum, we select two newspapers that describe themselves as 
independent-conservative and independent-liberal, respectively. Differences in ideological 
orientation might affect which interest groups are covered (see Binderkrantz et al. 2017)3. 
Having retrieved the relevant articles on all four issues for our entire observation period, 
we manually coded all 2,219 articles to identify all statements about the policy issue and 
classified the type of advocates who made the statement and the tone of the statement. We only 
code one statement per advocate per article, but one advocate could have been included several 
times in each year. As mentioned, we use an encompassing, behavioural definition of ‘interest 
advocates’ (Baroni et al. 2014) rather than limit the definition to non-state advocates with 
certain organizational structures. However, since we are interested in the impact of different 
societal actors on responses by politicians, we exclude statements by political actors, such as 
representatives from political parties and government officials, as well as private individuals. 
To capture the volume of media advocacy, we track the total number of statements that 
was recorded in each year on an issue. This measure includes neutral statements as well, and 
serves as an indication of the extent to which advocates raised the issue in the media. Altogether, 
we record 401 statements by a total of 262 actors on our four policy issues. 
                                                 
3 While it is important to rule out such bias in coverage, we do not expect pronounced differences between them 
in practice. In fact, both newspapers also stress that they aim at providing neutral coverage except on their opinion 
pages. The fact that most statements by non-state actors about the six-hour work day (a policy on which one would 
expect these two newspapers to be ideologically opposed) were in favour of the policy, supports this expectation. 
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To measure media advocacy support we calculate the percentage statements by advocates in 
the media in favour of a policy proposal published in a given year from all media statements 




We will now present the results of the aggregate-level analyses starting with models of political 
attention. Since this outcome variable is a count measure and not normally distributed (see 
Figure A1 in the Online Appendix), we used negative binomial regression (King & Zeng 2001). 
The distribution is also over-dispersed so that a standard Poisson count model would be a poor 
fit to the data. We present four models: model 1 has the main variables of interest but no 
interactions; model 2 adds the interaction between public opinion support and the policy status 
quo; model 3 includes the interaction between media advocacy support and the status quo 
instead; and model 4 includes both interactions. In all models, we lagged the explanatory 
variables with one year to ascertain the causal direction of influence between attention, on the 
one hand, and public opinion and media advocacy activity, on the other. We also include 
separate intercepts for each policy issue (issue ‘dummies’) to take into account potential 
unobserved heterogeneity between them, and we add a lagged dependent variable to address 
potential autocorrelation in political attention over time. 
Table 1 presents the results from the four estimated negative binomial regression models.  
According to the results, the (lagged) values of public support are positively and significantly 
associated with higher political attention. Moreover, the positive effect all but disappears for 
the cases when the policy proposal on which public support is expressed is in fact the policy 
status quo (see the negative interactions in models 2 and 4, which, however, are not statistically 
significant at conventional levels; see also the left panel of Figure 1 for a graph of the effects). 
Media advocacy support for a proposal as such does not seem to be significantly associated 
with the political attention to an issue in the legislature. However, the significant negative 
interaction with the status quo (see models 3 and 4) implies that when media advocacy is 
                                                 




supportive of the status quo, the discussion of the policy issues tends to be minimal (see the 
right panel of Figure 1).  
 
Table 1: Negative binomial (quasi-poisson) statistical models of political attention to four 
policy issues in the Swedish legislature (raw coefficients; standard errors in parentheses).  
 
Effect (1) (2) (3)     (4) 
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Dispersion parameter 3.84 3.69 3.11 3.08 
N 47 47 47 47 
 
Notes: Raw coefficients. Significance levels: †p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Dependent variable: Number of documents addressing a particular policy issue in the Swedish 
parliament (Riksdag) in a year. All independent variables lagged with one year. One-year lagged values of the 





Figure 1 Predicted Number of Agenda Items Discussed in the Swedish Parliament as a Function 
of Lagged Public Support for a Policy Proposal (Left Panel) and Lagged Relative Media 




Notes: Other variables held at mean or typical values. Black lines: Proposal is not the status quo. Red dashed lines: 
Proposal is the status quo. Plotted with 95 percent confidence intervals of the means of the predictions. 
 
Finally, we find no support for H2 that the volume (number) of media advocate claims on a 
policy proposal affects political attention. 
Figure 1 illustrates the scale of the effects by plotting the predicted probability of the 
number of agenda items discussed in the Swedish parliament as public support (left) and relative 
media advocacy support (right) range from the minimum to the maximum of their respective 
observed ranges (according the estimates of model 4; other variables set at median or typical 
values; the thin lines present 95 percent confidence intervals of the means of the predictions). 
The figure also illustrates the interaction effects as the predictions are drawn separately for 
scenarios when the proposal is the status quo (dashed red line) and when it is not (solid black 
line). In line with our expectation in H1a, higher public support for a policy increases political 
attention when it signals dissatisfaction with the status quo, but not otherwise: when public 
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support moves from its minimum to its maximum, the level of predicted political attention more 
than doubles (left panel; black line). 
When relative media advocacy support moves from its observed minimum to its observed 
maximum, the predicted number of agenda items being discussed decreases three times, but 
only when the policy proposal being polled is the current status quo (right panel; red lines). 
This implies that high relative support for the status quo suppresses political attention to the 
issue. Importantly, though, there is no evidence that advocates interested in changing the policy 
status quo are successful in stimulating political attention, contrary to what we hypothesized. It 
should be remembered, however, that our sample includes relatively few observations for which 
the proposal is the status quo and that these all concern one policy issue from the four. This 
invites caution in interpreting the predicted probabilities plotted in Figure 1. 
Below, we present a closer examination of the policy developments of policy on the four 
issues over time to scrutinize the mechanisms that drive political attention and produce change 
and to interpret the general findings presented above in the context of the individual cases. In 
order to provide an analysis of policy responsiveness, the qualitative discussion of our cases 
below places specific emphasis on the instance in which policy changed in line with how the 
proposal was formulated in the opinion poll (i.e., the closure of the second reactor at 
Barsebäck), to improve our understanding of how this policy change came about. 
To facilitate the discussion of each case, we present several figures for each policy issue 
– with the first representing the overall attention paid to the issue in the media and by Swedish 
politicians over time, and the second representing the relative public and media advocacy 
support for a policy proposal related to the issue. For each case, we systematically examine the 
policy developments and their possible relationship with public opinion and media advocacy 
support to evaluate our hypotheses and the mechanisms behind the links. 
Nuclear Energy 
Almost half of all Swedish energy is nuclear, which has been a salient topic in the country's 
politics (IEA 2014). After a 1980 referendum, Sweden decided to phase-out nuclear energy by 
2010, but this deadline was abandoned in 1997 in favour of a policy of long-term phase-out 
with no specific end-date (Holmberg & Hedberg 2010). The policy change was part of a cross-
party energy agreement between the Social Democratic Party (Socialdemokraterna), the Centre 
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Party (Centerpariet) and the Left Party (Vänsterpartiet), which advocated the 2010 phase-out 
deadline in the 1980 referendum. In 1998 the decision was made to close the first of two reactors 
at the nuclear power plant at Barsebäck. The decision was eventually carried out in 2001. In 
2004 the then-governing Social Democratic Party and its energy partners decided to close the 
second reactor at Barsebäck by 2005. This decision constitutes the one instance of policy 
change in our dataset that is in line with the proposal as phrased in the public opinion survey – 
namely, to phase-out nuclear energy. The right-wing government that came to power in 2006 
reversed the phase-out and eventually abolished the phase-out plans in 2010. 
 
Figure 2 Political and Media Attention (Left Panel) and Public Opinion and Advocacy Support 
(Right Panel) regarding the Proposal for Phasing-out Nuclear Energy. 
Notes: Political attention: Number of documents addressing a particular policy issue in the Swedish parliament 
(Riksdag) in a year. Media advocacy volume: Number of relevant statements by interest groups and advocates on 
the policy proposal in Svenska Dagbladet and Dagens Nyheter in a year. Public opinion support: Percentage of the 
public who think the policy proposal is ‘good’ or ‘very good’ from those with an opinion. Media advocacy support: 
Percentage of statements by advocates in the media in favour of a policy proposal published in a given year from 
all media statements that expressed an opinion on the specific policy proposal. The vertical dotted lines indicate 
relevant policy events and Table A3 in the Online Appendix lists the specific policy changes. 
 
While the plan to close the second reactor at Barsebäck had already been discussed in 2001 and 
2003, both the energy partners in the government and other political parties argued that 
18 
 
renewable energy sources were not developed enough to make up for the expected loss in 
production from the shutdown. When the energy partners did decide to close the second reactor 
at Barsebäck in 2004 as part of their long-term phase-out goal, they faced strong opposition 
from several directions. Not only were the other parties in the right-wing bloc strongly opposed, 
but public opinion and media advocacy (see below) had also turned against the phase-out (see 
Figure 2). 
Hence, on the face of it, the actions of the Swedish government do not seem particularly 
responsive to public opinion at the time. However, while closing reactors at Barsebäck, the 
government actually allowed other developments that undermined the impact of the phase-out 
plans. For example, a large nuclear power plant in Oskarshamn was completely renovated to 
expand its lifespan, and another company (Fortum) was allowed to expand the production 
capacity of its existing reactors. Combined, these developments largely offset the effects of the 
closures at Barsebäck over the course of the ensuing years. 
This would seem to be an opportunity for the Swedish energy partners to flag their 
responsiveness to public opinion, but surveying both the media and parliamentary debates at 
the time reveals that the government continued to present their policy as a long-term phase-out. 
After the new right-wing government came to power in 2006, public support for a phase-out 
actually increased with a majority favouring a phase-out when the government decided to 
abolish the policy in 2010. The increase in public support for a phase-out after 2011 can be 
attributed at least to some extent to the Fukushima disaster (Holmberg 2011; Holmberg & 
Hedberg 2013). This shift in public opinion led to an increase in political attention, but no steps 
towards a phase-out of nuclear energy were taken in response. 
Altogether, we can conclude that policy making regarding the nuclear phase-out was not 
directly responsive to public opinion (H1b), even if, in line with our aggregate findings, more 
support for a proposal to change the status quo did seem to coincide with more political attention 
to the issue in 2011 (H1a)5. 
From the right panel of Figure 2, it is clear that statements in the media by advocates were 
more negative than positive about the phase-out policy throughout almost the entire observation 
                                                 
5 This finding is somewhat contrary to the interpretation of Holmberg and Hedberg (2010), who find a close match 
between public opinion and policy output in Sweden. This discrepancy may be due to their broader focus (on all 
nuclear power policy) and the fact that their study only covers the period before the Fukushima disaster. 
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period. Most of the statements were made by power companies owning Swedish nuclear power 
plants – with the owner of Barsebäck – Sydkraft – being especially vocal in its opposition. 
Other advocates, such as labour unions and experts warning of increased CO2 emissions also 
spoke out against the phase-out. 
There is no clear relationship between the number of statements in the media and political 
attention (H2) (see the left panel of Figure 2), even if both political attention and the number of 
claims in the media spiked around the policy changes in 2004 (the decision to close Barsebäck) 
and 2009 (when the new right-wing government announced it would abolish the nuclear phase-
out policy). However, these spikes in attention seem to be driven by counter-mobilization 
against government plans by, for instance, the owner of the Barsebäck reactors, rather than by 
proactive agenda-setting through the media by these actors. 
Media advocacy also did not have a clear impact on policy change (H3b). However, 
several actors that made many of the negative claims about the phase-out policy do seem to 
have had a more subtle effect on the implementation of the decision to close the second 
Barsebäck reactor. By refusing government attempts to come to an agreement regarding the 
closure of nuclear reactors, industry actors (especially Sydkraft) were able to force the Swedish 
government to pay high levels of compensation for the closure 6 . Moreover, the same 
government allowed several energy companies to expand their production of nuclear energy in 
subsequent years. 
The media advocates, who were largely against a phase-out, did attain their preferences 
after the 2006 election. However, this may be more a consequence of an overlap between the 
preferences of media advocates and those of the new pro-nuclear power government than the 
result of effective (media) advocacy. Additionally, in 2005, the Centre Party (previously part 
of the energy agreement and of the right-wing bloc) changed its decades-long position in favour 
of a phase-out to one against, which paved the way for the abolishment of the policy7. All in 
all, then, the image emerges that even if policy sometimes did not follow the preferences of 
media advocates (as with the closure of Barsebäck 2), these actors did eventually attain their 
                                                 
6 Sydkraft was compensated for all costs related to the closure and given ownership of a reactor with the same 
capacity as Barsebäck 2, which was owned by Vattenfal. Vattenfal, in its turn, was also compensated financially. 
7 This interpretation is corroborated by other studies that have concluded that political considerations and partisan 
politics have historically been important in Swedish policy making on nuclear power (Nohrstedt 2010; Roßegger 
& Ramin 2013). 
20 
 
preferences or were compensated when they did not. When it comes to political attention, the 
relative increase in support for the phase-out by the media advocates in the wake of the 
Fukushima disaster (when the phase-out policy was not the status quo) was followed by 
increased political attention, providing some support for H3a. 
Six-hour Working Day 
The next proposal for policy change we analyze is the introduction of a six-hour working day. 
The idea of shortening the working day to six hours has been around for decades and was 
experimented with by Swedish companies and public service providers as early as the 1980s. 
The idea is also regularly picked up in international news media. The Swedish government 
commissioned expert committee reports on the six-hour working day (Rohdén 2000), and in 
recent years also funded a trial at a care facility. Still, there has been no formal policy change 
on the issue. In line with our general findings, it seems that the public was successful in spurring 
parliamentary debate of the issue, which received quite some attention in the Riksdag (H1a). 
However, this attention did not lead to policy change (H1b), even if public support for the 
proposal was very strong, if decreasingly so, over time: the public was more positive than 
negative in all years but 2010 (Figure 3). 
This lack of adoption of a policy proposal that is very popular among the public does not 
seem to have been caused by a strong counter-mobilization of advocates in the media. The level 
of advocacy support fluctuated significantly, partly due to the overall low number of relevant 
statements. Moreover, these statements – made mostly by experts, LO (Sweden's largest labour 
organization) and companies – were mostly positive about the six-hour working day. The 
opponents may have considered the proposal so unlikely to be implemented that they did not 
feel the need to mobilize to defend the status quo and express their preferences in the media. In 
any case, advocacy efforts in the media did not lead to a policy change (H3b), but the volume 
of advocacy claims and the amount of political attention both peeked around 2005, providing 
some support for H2b. During this peak in the number of claims (see Figure 3), positive and 
negative claims were balanced, which may explain why the peak in attention did not lead to 
further policy activity or more future political attention (H3a and H3b): when more actors did 
briefly mobilize and political attention increased, mobilization was stronger among those who 
were opposed to the six-hour work day. 
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The six-hour working day emerges as a very popular policy proposal, both among media 
advocates and the public, even if there is some reason to expect that counter-mobilization did 
not occur as actors did not deem the policy's introduction immanent. Given that the introduction 
of such a policy would be a major departure from international practices, it is perhaps not so 
surprising that the Swedish government has not implemented it yet, despite the support it 
enjoys. 
 
Figure 3: Political and Media Attention (Left Panel) and Public Opinion and Advocacy Support 
(Right Panel) regarding a Six-hour Working Day. 
 
Note: For definitions of the variables, see the notes to Figure 2. 
Alcohol Sale and Taxes 
The next two policy proposals we discuss relate to the regulation of alcohol use, so we discuss 
them together. Alcohol regulation policy in Sweden is more restrictive than in most other 
European countries (Karlsson & Osterberg 2001) and has traditionally focused on a strategy to 
lower consumption that combines high prices with limited availability. Although Sweden has 
had to loosen some of its restrictive policies since joining the European Union, the country 




Figure 4 Political and Media Attention (Left Panel) and Public Opinion and Advocacy Support 
(Right Panel) regarding Lowering Alcohol Taxes.  
 
Note: For definitions of the variables, see the notes to Figure 2. 
 
Figure 5 Political and Media Attention (Left Panel) and Public Opinion and Advocacy Support 
(Right Panel) with regard to Allowing the Sale of Alcohol in Supermarkets.  




This is evidenced by the two alcohol-related policies in our study: alcohol taxes, which are 
comparatively high in Sweden; and the sale of alcohol, which is only possible in Swedish stores 
under a state monopoly (called ‘Systembolaget’). For both issues, political attention was high 
during the start of our observation period, but declined shortly after 2005 (see Figures 4 and 5). 
These relatively high levels of attention and media debate (in the case of lowering taxes) are 
likely related to several developments that increased attention. Importantly, 2004 was the year 
all EU member states were required to allow the import of alcohol for personal use, and fears 
existed that the Swedish policy of high pricing and restricted access would be undermined. 
Both proposals for changing the policies (i.e., lowering alcohol taxes and relaxing the sale 
restrictions) were popular among the public at the start of our observation period (Figures 4 and 
5). While the main government party at the time, the Social Democrats, was not unfavourable 
to these proposals, it did not initiate policy change – possibly in order to accommodate its junior 
coalition partners. As expected in H1a, and in line with the results in our aggregate analysis, as 
public support for the proposals declined throughout the observation period, so too did political 
attention. Similarly, even when the right-wing political parties that had earlier expressed 
support for both proposals came to power in 2006, they did not lower taxes on alcohol or relax 
laws regarding alcohol sale. In fact, these parties raised taxes on alcohol in 2013 and 2014, 
whereas the sale of alcohol in supermarkets remained banned. Given that public support for 
both policies had sharply dropped at this point, this pattern is consistent with H1b. 
It is worth noting that media advocacy support varies strongly on both issues, partly due 
to the low number of advocacy statements (see Figures 4 and 5). Most claims were made by 
health experts and actors involved in the sale of alcohol, and have not left an obvious mark on 
the enacted policy changes (H3b). Moreover, even though the number of statements regarding 
alcohol taxes dropped as political attention also declined (in line with H2), most statements 
were reactions to political plans rather than proactive strategies aimed at setting the agenda. 
Due to the low total number of statements, positive statements also did not clearly affect 
political attention for the issue (H3a). To conclude, the story of alcohol regulation policies is 
one in which the Swedish public largely got what it wanted, while media advocacy was much 





In this study we set out to investigate how the preferences of the general public and interest 
groups active in the media affect policy making. We focused on a small number of regulatory 
policy issues in Sweden and observed them over relatively long periods of time. We examined 
both the occurrence of policy change and the attention the policy issues received in the 
legislature using aggregate and issue-level analyses. The selection of a relatively low number 
of issues allowed us to analyze each one in depth and to trace the details behind the aggregate 
associations we found in the data. 
Our findings reveal a complex picture, but the overall message is that there is not much 
evidence in favour of strong effects of either public opinion or media advocacy. If anything, 
when the public strongly dislikes a proposal, policy might be adapted to reflect its wishes, as 
seems to have happened when taxes on alcohol were raised in 2013 and 2014, but strong support 
for a proposal is not necessarily translated into policy change. While in the two alcohol 
regulation issues public opinion and regulation seemed to move in synchrony, when it comes 
to regulating the duration of the working day and nuclear phase-outs, there is quite some 
disconnect between the dynamics of public opinion and policy. Yet, stronger public support for 
a proposal is associated with more discussion of the issue in parliament. 
We find even less evidence that media advocacy matters. The aggregate-level analysis 
revealed no clear effects of media advocacy on attention for an issue, other than very low levels 
of political attention when the media advocates are strongly in favour of the status quo. When 
looking more closely at the cases, there is some evidence that politicians sometimes find ways 
to accommodate media advocacy pressure without changing formal policy. An example is the 
phase-out of nuclear power, where, in spite of closing the Barsebäck reactor, the Swedish 
government allowed the expansion of existing plants, which was a policy action in line with 
advocate claims in the media and against public preferences. In this case, media advocates do 
not seem to have lived up to the ideal of acting as a transmission belt between the public and 
the government, but, if anything, worked to prevent public preferences from being turned into 
policy. 
Some of these null findings might be due to the fact that policy change is rare and that the 
greatest potential for public opinion and interest groups to influence policy might be for ‘non-
decision-making’ (i.e., to keep issues off the agenda). Although our study covers relatively long 
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time periods compared to most existing analyses, our data still contains very few policy events. 
This is in itself a substantively interesting finding as it reminds us that the policy status quo is 
rather stable, and the lack of policy change is possibly over-determined. One might need a very 
special confluence of factors to change policy, and strong support by the public and/or interest 
advocates might not be sufficient, and not even necessary for such change. In fact, there is some 
evidence in our case studies that political elites can play a strong role both when it comes to 
deciding to change policy as well as to keep popular issues off the political agenda. Rather than 
casting a view of policy making as involving a simple trade-off between responding to the views 
of either media advocates or the public, we find several instances where politicians decide to 
follow a third course (for a similar view of Swedish politics, see Esaiasson & Holmberg 1996; 
Holmberg 1997). This suggests that politicians are aware of and rhetorically responsive to 
public preferences, but that they are not always able or willing to implement popular proposals, 
contrary to what many in the literature assume. It also implies that studying political attention 
alone is not sufficient since even politicians who are rhetorically responsive may not be able to 
then deliver actual policy. 
Finally, our results indicate that often interest groups may not be well placed to strengthen 
the responsiveness of policy to public opinion. The case studies suggest instead that other 
considerations may take primacy over public preferences when it comes to the actual 
introduction of policies. 
Our findings are even more significant given our initial expectation that Sweden would 
be a likely case for experiencing a high degree of responsiveness due to its strong reputation of 
political accountability and well-established system of interest representation. In addition, it is 
remarkable that we find no impact of public opinion on policy change on issues on which the 
public has been polled for its policy preferences. The continuous polling implies that the public 
has been assumed to have meaningful and well-formed preferences with regard to the policy 
options on these issues. Moreover, polls may be more likely to be conducted on salient issues 
where there is greater pressure on the policy makers to be responsive. Still, when public 
preferences supported change in our cases, change did not occur8. 
                                                 
8 For interest groups, it is less clear whether salience weakens or strengthens their impact, which is likely to depend 
on whether their position enjoys public support (Rasmussen et al. 2018). Interest groups may have a greater say 
over policies that the public cares less about, while on issues where groups and the public are united increasing 
the public visibility of an issue may be positive for them. 
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There is scope for future research to investigate these relationships further by expanding 
our approach to analyzing a larger number of policies and a broader range of countries. The 
sample of policy issues we study implies certain limitations about the generalizability of our 
inferences. All four issues can be considered regulatory ones. It is possible that policy making 
on distributive and redistributive issues generates a different dynamic and is embedded in 
different institutional settings so that public opinion and/or interest groups play systematically 
different roles on such issues. Importantly, labour unions and employers’ organizations have 
direct access to the negotiation table when it comes to issues related to employment conditions, 
labour market policy or pensions. Still, corporatism in Sweden has been on the decline (Lindvall 
& Sebring 2005) and one of our issues – the introduction of the six-hour workday – has both 
regulatory and distributive aspects, so the relevance of our findings beyond the universe of 
regulatory policy issues should not be dismissed entirely. 
It will also be possible in future research to expand our study beyond that of advocacy 
claims and statements in the media. Focusing on media advocacy means that we can map group 
involvement in a replicable way over a long time period without being dependent on the 
memory of experts or the use of formal ways of consultation on the issues. However, (print) 
media is but one strategy used by interest groups, and it remains possible that they have an 
impact through other, more covert channels. Our findings should therefore be scrutinized in 
future work comparing multiple channels of lobbying. 
We also believe there are benefits to a continued use of a multi-method approach to 
explore the complex relationship between these different actors and policy. The combination 
of methods we employed in the analysis allowed us to look beyond the aggregate patterns that 
the statistical analyses provided and interpret the results. We showed how our aggregate 
findings can be interpreted only in light of the specific policy issue context and in light of issue-
specific information about the evolution of the policies. With this, our approach tries to bridge 
the quantitative literatures on policy responsiveness and interest group influence and the case 
study scholarship on policy evolution. As we demonstrated, both the quantitative and case-
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Table A1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Minimum Mean Maximum  St. dev. 
Public support (%) 22 53 77 13 
Relative media advocacy support (%) 0 42 100 41 
Media advocacy volume 0 7 25 8 
Political attention  2 41 123 34 
Public support is measured as the percentage of the public in favor of the policy change in a year. Relative media 
advocacy support measures the percentage of statements in favor of the policy of the total number of statements 
by advocates in a year. Media advocacy volume measures the total number of statements by advocates in a year. 
Political attention measures the total number of documents produced in the Riksdag that mentions the issue. 
 








 N policy changes  
(in line/total) 
Phasing-out nuclear energy 1998 2013 16 1/3 
Introduction of a six-hour working day 1996 2013 18 0/0 
Decreasing tax on alcohol sales 2002 2014 13 0/2 
Allowing the sale of alcohol in supermarkets 2004 2014 11 0/0 
Policy changes ‘in line’ are policy changes that were in conformity with public opinion on an item as it was 
formulated in the survey question (for example a policy was introduced to phase-out nuclear energy), policy 






Table A3: Policy changes marked in Figures 2 and 4 
 
Issue Year Policy change 
Phasing-out nuclear energy 1998 Decision to close the first reactor at Barsebäck  
Phasing-out nuclear energy 2004 Decision to close the second reactor at Barsebäck 
Phasing-out nuclear energy 2006 Decision not to close any more reactors until 2010 
Phasing-out nuclear energy 2010 Decision to abolish the phase-out policy 
Decreasing tax on alcohol sales 2013 Decision to raise taxes on alcohol sales  




Figure A1: Histogram (probability density) of political attention (the number of documents 
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